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ABSTRACT: As part of health care reform, Congress is considering the Community Living 
Assistance Services and Supports (CLASS) Act. The measure would mark the most significant 
change since 1965 in the way the U.S. finances long-term care, the personal assistance delivered 
both at home and in nursing facilities to the frail elderly and other adults with disabilities. As 
policymakers consider the CLASS Act, they may be able to learn from past experiments in the 
U.S. as well as from the experiences of other major industrialized countries, most of which have 
migrated to universal, government-run financing systems. Although those models vary markedly 
in their specifics, they appear to be both broadly popular and somewhat more costly than 
expected. By contrast, the CLASS Act is a voluntary system that attempts to meld public 
insurance with private long-term care coverage and Medicaid. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
Broad health care reform legislation being considered by Congress would effect a 
major change in the way the United States finances long-term care. The Community 
Living Assistance Services and Supports (CLASS) Act would create a voluntary national 
long-term care insurance program. As lawmakers debate the potentially far-reaching 
proposal, they may learn from the experiences of other developed nations and from recent 
experiments in the U.S. 
 
Long-term care is the personal assistance that the frail elderly and other adults 
with disabilities require to maintain the best possible quality of life. The assistance may 
be delivered at home or in a nursing facility or other congregant care setting. In the U.S., 
most long-term care is provided by family members, and some by paid aides. The cost of 
formal care is quite high, averaging $75,000 per year for residence in a skilled nursing 
facility and $20 per hour for home health aides. 
 
In Japan and much of Europe, public benefits for long-term care of the frail 
elderly have become a pillar of social policy, along with retirement and health care. 
While many nations have enacted major reforms over the past two decades, they have 
taken somewhat different approaches. 
 
Most major industrialized nations have adopted a social insurance model to 
provide long-term care to all who need it. Purchase of insurance is mandatory, often 
through payroll taxes, although some nations also finance their long-term care systems 
with premiums and general fund revenues. Some provide cash benefits, others pay 
approved service providers directly, and still others give consumers an option of 
receiving benefits in either form. While benefits are sometimes means-tested, all who are 
medically eligible receive at least some payment. These systems contrast sharply with the 
U.S., where Medicaid provides long-term care only for those who meet strict income and 
asset tests, and with the United Kingdom, which retains a similar means-tested program. 
 
This paper reviews the experiences of France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, 
and the United Kingdom, and highlights some of the lessons the United States can learn 
from each. Broadly, there appear to be two. The first is that shifting from a means-tested 
design to an insurance model appears to be workable and quite popular. The second is that 
long-term care costs have increased more rapidly than expected in those nations that have 
adopted reforms, although in most cases these additional costs appear to be manageable. 
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While other nations have embraced universal, government-managed long-term 
care insurance over the past two decades, the U.S. has moved in a very different 
direction. It took modest steps to expand private long-term care insurance through tax 
incentives and government-funded marketing campaigns, and by tying this coverage 
more closely to Medicaid. These efforts, however, have met with little success, and 
participation in private insurance remains very low. 
 
The CLASS Act is a significant departure from prior efforts. While CLASS builds 
on elements of past experience in the U.S. as well as on other nations’ reforms, it is in 
many ways unique. In contrast to the social insurance model adopted in most developed 
nations, participation in CLASS insurance would be voluntary. All workers would be 
enrolled automatically, but would have the ability to opt out. At the same time, in contrast 
to past U.S. initiatives, CLASS creates a government insurance program rather than 
enhancing incentives for the purchase of private coverage. Yet, because it is likely to 
offer only a modest benefit, the CLASS design also anticipates the use of private 
insurance to supplement government coverage. In sum, while most industrialized 
countries have adopted a mandatory social insurance framework for long-term care,  
the U.S. is attempting to marry government insurance with a voluntary design not yet 
tried elsewhere. 
 
That voluntary design presents some potentially significant problems. Would 
young and healthy consumers, for instance, be willing to buy the insurance through a 
government plan, despite their lack of interest in purchasing private coverage? If they do 
not subscribe, the program faces the serious problem of adverse selection that is likely to 
drive up premiums and further discourage low-risk buyers. Such adverse selection does 
not occur where participation is mandatory. 
 
A successful national long-term care insurance system should accomplish at least 
three goals: more consumer choice and flexibility, a shift from the welfare-based 
Medicaid system to universal or near-universal insurance coverage, and a stable funding 
source for long-term services. While the CLASS Act is unlikely to fully achieve any one 
of these goals, it is a step toward each. 
 
A caveat: This paper focuses principally on financing long-term care. Ultimately, 
the success of any financing system will be measured by the quality of the care it funds. 
While the delivery of long-term care services may itself require major reform, and is 
inextricably linked to financing issues, it lies outside the purview of this paper.
 
 vi
LONG-TERM CARE FINANCING REFORM: 
LESSONS FROM THE U.S. AND ABROAD 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
In contrast to acute medical care, long-term care helps those with chronic illnesses 
manage their daily lives in relative comfort and security. Such care is provided to both 
the frail elderly and the disabled, and may include assistance with eating, cooking, and 
bathing and toileting. It may be provided at home, in a nursing facility, or in another 
congregant care setting such as an assisted living facility or group home. 
 
About two-thirds of those who turned 65 in 2005 need or will need some long-
term services in their lives. Those 65 and older will require assistance for an average of 
three years over their remaining lifetimes.1 Currently, about 10 million Americans need 
some form of long-term care. Sixty percent of them are 65 or older. 
 
Long-term care can be extremely expensive. The “private pay” rate for a single 
room in a nursing home averages $75,000 per year. Home health aides cost an average of 
$20 per hour.2 Overall, about $230 billion was spent on long-term services in the U.S.  
in 2008. 
 
In the United States, more than 40 percent of paid long-term care is funded by 
Medicaid, the joint federal–state health program for the poor (Exhibit 1). Less than 10 
percent is financed by private long-term care insurance. Much of the remainder is paid 
out-of-pocket by those receiving care or by their families.3 However, it is important to 
note that well over half of all long-term care is informal, unpaid assistance provided by 
spouses or other relatives,4 usually daughters. AARP calculates that in 2007 the 
economic value of this care was $375 billion.5
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Exhibit 1. Long-Term Care Spending in the United States
Share of total spending, 2006
Medicaid
43%
Medicare
18%
Private insurance
7%
Out-of-pocket
28%
Other
4%
Source: Avalere Health, the SCAN Foundation.  
 
While the existing Medicaid-based system offers relatively comprehensive 
coverage for the poor, it is problematic for the middle class. To become eligible, people 
must effectively impoverish themselves. In most states, an unmarried individual must 
“spend down” financial assets to $2,000 to qualify, and must fall within severe  
income limits. 
 
Although the United States makes limited consumer-directed care available 
through Medicaid, most program payments are still made directly to highly regulated and 
licensed providers, such as nursing homes or home care agencies. In addition, Medicaid 
provides an entitlement to institutional services only. There is no requirement that states 
provide long-term care in a home or community setting. So while many states offer some 
Medicaid home-care benefits, such assistance tends to be limited. Many states, for 
example, have long waiting lists for home-based care. Many of the frail elderly and other 
adults with disabilities must therefore move into nursing facilities in order to receive 
Medicaid benefits—despite consumers’ preferences to remain at home as long as 
possible. In 2007, nearly three-quarters of the program’s long-term care benefits for 
adults with disabilities and the frail elderly were paid to nursing facilities.6  
 
At the same time, growth in long-term care costs for both the elderly and disabled 
is driving substantial increases in government health expenditures, especially for 
Medicaid, which spent more than $100 billion—or one-third of its budget—on such 
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assistance in 2007.7 This cost growth may become especially problematic as 77 million 
baby boomers reach old age over the next three decades. By 2050, total Medicaid 
spending could exceed 6.5 percent of GDP,8 the equivalent of $900 billion today. 
 
Consumers seeking to hedge against their risk of needing costly long-term 
services may purchase private insurance. To date, however, the demand for such 
insurance has been modest owing to the price and complexity of policies and the 
reluctance of consumers to confront the prospect of disability in old age. The existence of 
Medicaid may be a further disincentive to purchase private insurance.9 There are roughly 
7 million policies in force, covering about 10 percent of those age 65 and older.10
 
EXPERIENCES FROM ABROAD 
Most other major industrialized nations have remade their long-term care systems over 
the past two decades. Such nations as Germany, France, Luxembourg, Norway, 
Netherlands, Korea, and Japan have fundamentally restructured their financing programs. 
By contrast, while the United Kingdom has repeatedly reconsidered its existing system, it 
has yet to enact major financing reforms. This paper will focus on the experiences of five 
nations—France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, and the U.K. (Exhibit 2). 
 
Exhibit 2. International Models for Long-Term Care Financing 
 Financing Benefit Eligibility 
Private 
Insurance 
United  
States 
General revenue Service/ 
Limited cash 
Means-tested <10% 
France General revenue Cash only Universal/Steep 
income-related 
coinsurance 
25% of those 
60+ 
Germany Payroll tax Cash or 
service 
Universal <10%, optional 
for high-earners 
Japan Payroll tax/ 
General revenue/ 
Income-related 
premium 
Service only Universal for 65+ None 
Netherlands Income-related 
taxes/Means-tested 
copayments 
Cash or 
service 
Universal Mandatory, 
managed by 
private 
insurance 
United  
Kingdom 
General revenue Service or cash Means-tested Very limited 
Source: Author’s summary of OECD data. 
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Most of these countries face more severe demographic pressures than the United 
States. In 2000, about 12.4 percent of the U.S. population was 65 or older compared with 
14 percent in Netherlands, 15.9 percent in the U.K., 16.4 percent in Germany, and 17.4 
percent in Japan. By 2040, the disparity will be even wider. About 20.4 percent of the 
U.S. population will be 65 or older, compared with 35.0 percent in Japan (Exhibit 3).11
 
 
Exhibit 3. Population Age 65 and Older, 2000 and 2040
0
10
20
30
40
France Germany Japan Netherlands United
Kingdom
United
States
2000 2040
Percentage of population
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.  
 
It is also important to note that these nations have developed their long-term  
care models in the context of well-established public health insurance systems. The 
chronically ill frequently receive long-term care and medical treatment simultaneously, 
so it may be somewhat easier for countries with national health insurance to develop 
public systems to pay for long-term care. While even those countries struggle to make 
this nexus seamless, their environment contrasts with the patchwork system in the United 
States, where those in long-term care may be receiving acute medical benefits from 
traditional Medicare, private Medicare supplement insurance (Medigap), Medicare 
managed care, employer-sponsored retiree health insurance, or Medicaid. 
 
Japan and many European nations have developed long-term care financing 
arrangements that are quite different from those in the U.S. and somewhat distinct from 
one another. Germany and several other countries have established universal long-term 
care social insurance financed largely through a payroll tax. Japan’s public insurance is 
funded by a combination of premiums and taxes and is available to all regardless of 
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income. Benefits, however, are targeted to those 65 and older. In Netherlands, long-term 
care insurance also is funded by a combination of taxes, but benefits are available to all. 
In France, assistance is funded by general revenues and available to everyone over 60. 
However, high-income individuals receive only a small fraction of the maximum benefit. 
In the U.K., those over 65 receive means-tested benefits funded through general 
revenues, similar to the system in the United States. 
 
Some countries have chosen to provide extremely flexible benefits, while others 
have not. Japan provides only services. Seniors in France receive cash, which they may 
use to purchase the assistance they choose. Germany, Netherlands, and the U.K. allow 
either cash or services. In many of these countries, benefits are designed to encourage 
home care rather than institutionalization. 
 
Private long-term care insurance is widely available in the U.S., although 
participation remains very low—about 7 million people have it. In Germany, this 
coverage is available for high-income individuals and as supplemental coverage for all, 
although participation rates are similar to those in the U.S. (less than 10 percent). In 
France, private coverage is proportionally more extensive, with about 3 million policies 
in force (25 percent of the population age 60 and older). In Netherlands, while long-term 
care is a universal public benefit, all insurance is administered by private companies 
(which also manage universal health insurance). By contrast, private insurance markets 
are far less developed in the U.K. and Japan. 
 
A major question facing policymakers is whether the widespread availability of 
either private insurance or government-funded assistance will encourage a significant 
increase in demand for paid home care, thus driving spending to unsustainable levels. It 
remains unclear from the Japanese and European experiences whether this phenomenon, 
sometimes called the woodwork effect, is a serious concern. Netherlands saw a 
substantial increase in costs as it expanded its long-term care program. In Japan, long-
term care costs also appear to be higher than originally expected. However, 20 percent of 
those certified for benefits do not participate in the program and participants use on 
average only half of their maximum allowable benefits. In Germany, the share of families 
taking cash benefits for home care has remained fairly steady over the life of the 
program. At the same time, reliance on institutional care has increased somewhat, 
especially for those with low levels of care needs. 
 
Seen through one prism, public expenditures on all long-term care were 
remarkably similar across most countries studied: For 2005, those outlays were  
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1.1 percent of GDP in France, 1.0 percent in Germany, 0.9 percent in Japan, 1.1 percent 
in the U.K., and 0.9 percent in the U.S.12 Costs were noticeably higher in Netherlands, 
however, where public expenditures were 1.7 percent of GDP (Exhibit 4).13
 
Exhibit 4. Public Expenditures for Long-Term Care, 2005
0.0
0.5
1.0
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Percentage of GDP
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Schut and van den Berg, 2009.  
 
However, by other measures public long-term care spending in Germany may be 
significantly lower than in the U.S. and Japan, at least for the frail elderly. According to 
those estimates, government in the U.S. spends $1,605 on long-term care for each person 
65 and older, while Japan spends $1,751 and Germany spends $1,185.14
 
Germany 
Germany operates a long-term care system that is parallel to but separate from its health 
insurance plan. The program is managed by the central government, but individual states 
are responsible for providing the necessary long-term care infrastructure. Benefits are 
uniform across the country, with no regional variation.15
 
Initially, the program built strong cash balances, although it was intended to 
operate as a pay-as-you-go system. After some years of experience, the government 
concluded that the ratio of benefit levels to costs had fallen to troublingly low levels, in 
large part because benefits were not indexed to inflation. As a result, beginning in 2008, 
the government raised both contributions and benefits. 
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Financing. In 1995, Germany instituted a mandatory, universal long-term care 
insurance system. The social insurance portion was initially funded with a payroll tax of 
1.7 percent, divided equally between workers and employers. In 2005, an additional 
premium of 0.25 percent was imposed on those with no children. This was done to reflect 
the likelihood that they would require higher insurance benefits in the absence of children 
to provide unpaid care. 
 
In 2008, the basic premium was increased to 1.95 percent of payroll (with the 
add-on for the childless continuing). At the same time, benefits, which were not indexed 
in 2005, were increased.16 Some benefits, including in-kind services and assistance for 
some severely disabled populations, will be raised annually until 2012. All benefits will 
be reviewed for adequacy every three years thereafter. 
 
During 2007, as the government was revising its long-term care program, 
Germany debated whether to shift from income-related contributions to fixed premiums. 
Ultimately, the government chose to maintain its income-based payroll tax structure.17
 
Participation. Germany’s public insurance covers about 70 million people. 
Another 9 million higher-income individuals choose to purchase private insurance rather 
than participate in the government program. All workers, however, must have some long-
term care coverage.18
 
About 2 million Germans (2.4 percent of the population) currently receive 
benefits under the program. Two-thirds opt for home care.19 However, there has been a 
small increase in demand for nursing-facility care since the program was created. In 
1997, the first full year in which institutional care was funded under the new program, 
24.6 percent of beneficiaries chose nursing homes. In 2005, 27.9 percent were using such 
care. Expenditures for institutional care increased from about 42 percent to 48 percent.20
 
Benefits. Benefits are available for both the aged and the disabled. However, 
applicants must show a considerable need for care before receiving benefits.21
 
Patients are first assessed for care need by regional medical board staff. Families 
may opt to obtain benefits in one of three ways. They may receive cash, which they can 
use for a wide range of purposes that include hiring professional caregivers, paying 
family members for caregiving, or renovating their homes to make them accessible to the 
disabled. They may opt for an in-kind service benefit, where care is provided directly by 
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an agency under contract to the insurance program. Or they may choose a combination  
of both.22
 
The cash payment is significantly lower than the direct-service benefit. In 2008, 
for instance, a patient who needed around-the-clock long-term care at home was eligible 
for direct in-kind benefits of €1,432 ($2,151) per month, but would receive a monthly 
cash payment of only €675 ($1,014). In-kind benefits are expected to pay about half the 
cost of home care. Those who need full-time institutional care receive a service benefit 
valued at up to €1,470 ($2,208) per month, depending on their level of disability, with an 
added supplement of up to €486 ($730) for those with dementia.23 It is important to note 
that the institutional benefit level is based only on the cost of care in a nursing home, and 
excludes room and board. 
 
The social insurance program also provides for medical equipment, respite care, 
and caregiving training for family members. Facilities for caregiving training and support 
are somewhat limited, with quality varying widely among the states.24
 
Lessons for the U.S. The German program has succeeded in substantially 
reducing the number of long-term care patients on means-tested public assistance, 
especially for those receiving care at home.25 Germany also provides families with 
flexible benefits they may tailor to their individual needs at a relatively low per capita 
cost. Public spending for long-term care (as measured per person age 65 or older) may be 
74 percent of that in the U.S., or approximately $1,185.26
 
However, since 1999, the system’s annual cash flow has been consistently 
negative, albeit to a modest degree. In 2004, for instance, expenditures exceeded 
revenues by 4.5 percent.27 Some analysts in Germany are troubled by this trend, 
especially as they look ahead to the nation’s growing dependency ratio.28 It is of 
particular concern because, with the combined payroll tax rate in Germany already 
approaching 28 percent, after-tax labor costs in Germany are already quite high. 
 
Maintaining current standards of care could require significant payroll tax 
increases in coming years. According to one estimate, the payroll tax rate for long-term 
care insurance will have to increase from 1.9 percent to at least 3.2 percent by 2040.29
 
In sum, Germany appears to have successfully added long-term care to its social 
insurance system. It remains financially viable, though long-run cost trends are 
potentially troubling. 
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Netherlands 
The Dutch were the first to establish universal social insurance for long-term care. 
Created in 1968, the Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (AWBZ) has steadily evolved, 
although it remains unique in many ways. It is universal but, unlike most other social 
insurance models, is administered by private insurance companies rather than by the 
state. It should be noted, however, that while private insurers manage the program, they 
do not bear financial risk. 
 
The AWBZ is closely tied to the national health system and covers some 
catastrophic medical costs—such as long-term hospitalizations, rehabilitation, nursing 
care, and even prenatal care—as well as long-term care expenses. The program is broadly 
popular but, even more than other nations providing national long-term care insurance, 
the Dutch have struggled with significant cost increases. 
 
Financing. Netherlands has had universal health insurance since World War II, 
but its long-term care system was highly fragmented until 1968, when the AWBZ was 
enacted. The system is designed to be pay-as-you-go, so that annual revenues closely 
match claims. There are no reserves against future payments. Its principal source of 
revenue is an income-related premium that is collected through both the income and 
payroll tax systems. The annual premium in 2008 was 12.15 percent of the first €31,589 
($47,400) or a maximum of €3,838 ($5,700), normally collected by employers along with 
other social insurance contributions.30 The average premium was about €320 ($480) per 
month.31 Premiums are adjusted annually to reflect changes in costs, and while the 2008 
rate was down somewhat from 2005, it was 21 percent higher than a decade earlier.32
 
Beneficiaries are also responsible for copayments that are based on income, care 
setting, and family status. These can be as high as €1,800 ($2,700) per month. Overall, 
individuals pay about 75 percent of the program’s annual cost. General fund revenues 
cover the remainder. 
 
Participation. Every Dutch citizen who is older than 15 and has taxable income 
pays into the system. There is no underwriting, so all are guaranteed coverage. In 2008, 
almost 600,000 received benefits through the program—two-thirds of whom were 
elderly, one-fifth disabled, and the rest with psychiatric disorders. The recipients 
represented about 3.6 percent of the population.33
 
Benefits. Since its inception, the AWBZ has paid for a broad spectrum of care, 
both for those living at home and for those residing in nursing facilities or other 
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institutions. About 55 percent receive care at home, where they receive what observers 
call an “extraordinary” level of assistance.34 Benefits are delivered either through in-kind 
payments directly to care providers or through cash payments in a system of personal 
budgets, which are expected to pay about 75 percent of average provider fees. In 2008, 
about 83 percent of benefits were in-kind and, while spending on personal budgets has 
been gradually increasing, there has been no decline in use of direct provider payments. 
 
Overall costs have increased rapidly, from the equivalent of less than €1 billion 
when the program began, in 1968, to almost €13 billion in 1998 and more than €20 
billion in 2008. As a result, public spending on long-term care in the Netherlands is 
significantly higher than that in other countries studied in this report, and—with the 
exception of Norway and Sweden—the highest among OECD countries. The Dutch also 
have a substantially higher ratio of public long-term care spending to acute health care 
outlays. For example, in 2005, the Dutch spent $1.00 on long-term care for every $3.00 
they spent on health care. By contrast, the Germans spent $1.00 for every $7.80, while 
the U.S. spent about $1.00 in public long-term care resources for every $6.00 in 
government medical care (Exhibit 5).35
 
Exhibit 5. Public Spending for Health Care and Long-Term Care, 2005
(as a share of GDP)
0
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Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2006.  
 
The government has attempted several strategies for controlling costs. In the 
1990s, it capped budgets, a step that created long waiting lists for some services. 
However, that effort was overturned by the Dutch courts in 1999. More recently, the 
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government has increased the role of informal care provided by family members and 
friends, and made this obligation more explicit. In 2007, funding for domestic help was 
shifted from the AWBZ to local municipalities. As a result, services such as home 
cleaning are no longer covered by insurance.36
 
The Dutch are currently in the midst of a major debate over the future of the 
program. Some reformers argue that the AWBZ should be abolished and folded into the 
national health system—which itself was restructured as a universal system of managed 
competition in 2006. Others argue that long-term care should remain separate, though 
with major changes. This latter approach has been adopted by the government. An 
influential 2008 report by the Social and Economic Council recommended more carefully 
defining what services would be provided through the AWBZ, establishing uniform 
needs assessments, shifting some services such as rehabilitation to the health system, and 
no longer reimbursing the cost of room and board.37
 
Lessons for the U.S. The Dutch system is a model for a public/private partnership. 
Insurance is universal and mandatory, and funded principally through tax revenues. 
However, the long-term care program is managed by large regional insurance firms. 
 
The AWBZ appears to be quite popular. However, it is important to note that the 
Dutch struggle with costs, driven especially by younger people with disabilities who have 
opted for cash benefits through personal care budgets. As a result, the Dutch have 
refocused care on those most in need of assistance, eliminated some benefits entirely,  
and imposed stricter needs assessments. Still, premium rates have increased by more than 
20 percent over the past decade. 
 
Japan 
Faced with some of the most severe pressures among the world’s nations to reform its 
long-term care system, Japan created its own social insurance program in 2000. High life 
expectancy, low birthrates, and a restrictive immigration policy combined to create 
difficult demographic challenges. 
 
At the same time, Japan was suffering a growing backlash from daughters (and 
daughters-in-law) who were expected to care for elderly parents, with little support. In 
addition, it struggled with challenging payment and delivery issues. For example, because 
Japan offered free hospital care to the frail elderly but provided few long-term care 
services outside of these institutions, hospitals had become the default care setting for 
many elderly Japanese. One-third of older patients remained in the hospital for a year or 
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more.38 By contrast, the average hospital stay for an American 65 or older is fewer than 
five days. 
 
As a result, Japan’s long-term care reforms were aimed at meeting at least five 
objectives: 1) increasing the level of independence for the frail elderly; 2) reducing the 
burden of home care on their families; 3) more closely aligning benefits and premiums; 
4) providing more comprehensive care by integrating medical and long-term care 
programs; and 5) reducing the number of hospitalized elderly.39
 
Financing. The program is designed as a pay-as-you-go system. While it is 
structured as social insurance, it is financed by a combination of both contributions and 
general tax revenues. The general fund portion, which covers half the cost, is divided 
among the central government, prefectures, and municipalities. The social insurance 
element is financed by a combination of payroll taxes and modest monthly premiums.  
In some ways, this mixed payment system resembles Medicare, also funded by a 
combination of payroll taxes, general revenues, and beneficiary premiums. 
 
In Japan, all workers ages 40 to 64 pay a contribution rate of 0.9 percent, divided 
equally between employers and employees. The contribution is an add-on to the health 
insurance payroll tax. Those 65 and older pay an income-based monthly premium, which 
averages about $30 and covers about 17 percent of the program’s cost. Together, the 
payroll contribution and the premium finance about 50 percent of costs. Users of long-
term care are also required to contribute a 10 percent copayment for all services.40
 
Participation. Unlike Germany’s program, which provides assistance for all 
regardless of age, Japan’s largely limits benefits to those 65 and older. Those who are ages 
40–64 are covered only if they suffer from age-related diseases such as dementia. Among 
older Japanese, nearly all who apply are approved for care. However, as of September 
2008, 4.47 million Japanese were certified as needing long-term care, while just 3.66 
million (2.8 percent of the total population) chose to receive benefits.41 On average, 
home care recipients used approximately half the maximum benefit to which they were 
entitled. 
 
Benefits. The system covers both institutional and home care but, unlike 
Germany’s, it provides no cash benefits, only services. While a growing share of home 
care is provided by newly created for-profit firms, institutional care is delivered by 
nonprofits. For those with low incomes, both care and board in nursing homes are paid by 
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insurance. For higher-income residents of nursing facilities, insurance pays for care only; 
the cost of housing and meals is not covered. 
 
Japanese long-term care insurance has achieved some of its initial goals. It has 
relieved pressure on family caregivers, improved the quality of life for some elderly, and 
put in place a framework for addressing the nation’s severe demographic challenges. 
However, it has had little success in reducing long-term hospital utilization for those over 
65. In 2007, Japan had 362,000 long-term hospital beds, roughly the same as in 2003 and 
down only modestly from the peak of 384,000 in 2005. 
 
The 2000 law that created the social insurance system required regular review. 
Faced with higher-than-expected costs, the government made several changes to the 
program by both raising fees and reducing benefits. Beginning in 2006, families were 
required to pay an additional $300 monthly fee for nursing home care, and benefits were 
limited to preventive services for those requiring the lowest levels of care. At the same 
time, payments to providers decreased. These changes slowed the rate of spending 
growth from 8.8 percent in 2004 to 0.6 percent in 2006.42 The government has also set a 
goal of reducing long-term hospital beds to 210,000 in 2011.43
 
Public insurance for long-term care is provided by each of Japan’s 1,800 
municipalities. Premiums vary slightly by jurisdiction, but prices and copayments are 
fixed by the central government.44
 
Once individuals apply for benefits, they are given an assessment and approved 
for one of six levels of care. They are then assigned a case manager who helps design an 
appropriate care plan.45 Monthly benefits range from approximately $550 to $3,700 and 
are capped. Any costs that exceed those maximum levels are borne by the aged and their 
families. However, in contrast to Germany, which aims to cover roughly half of long-
term care costs, Japan attempts to cover 90 percent.46 Campbell et al. estimate total 
public spending per person age 65 and older at approximately $1,751 in 2005—about 9 
percent higher than in the U.S. (Exhibit 6).47
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Exhibit 6. Public Spending on Long-Term Care for the Elderly
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Lessons for the U.S. Japan appears to have successfully designed long-term care 
as a social insurance program. However, the transition has not been without problems. 
 
As intended, public insurance has relieved some of the burden on family 
members. It has also increased public costs. Japan has seen a significant increase in 
demand for paid care, especially at lower levels of acuity, as well as longer waiting lists 
for skilled nursing facilities.48
 
The government has responded to these challenges by scaling back benefits 
without losing public support for the program. However, the insurance program’s lack of 
coverage for most of those disabled who are younger than 65 may be problematic. In 
addition, it remains to be seen whether increases in preventive services will reduce demand 
for long-term care. Finally, while the focus in the U.S. has been on shifting to cash 
benefits, the Japanese services-only system appears to be working well for its population. 
 
France 
France adopted its new system, called the Allocation Personnalisée d’Autonomie (APA), 
or personalized independence allowance, in 2002. However, while Germany and Japan 
adopted social insurance as a model for providing long-term care needs, France chose a 
hybrid approach. The German and Japanese systems provide benefits based on care need, 
regardless of income, and are funded in large part by contributions and dedicated payroll 
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taxes. The French program reduces benefits for high-income seniors and is financed 
entirely through general tax revenues. 
 
Financing. The APA is financed through general revenues, funded jointly by the 
central and regional governments but administered at the regional level. 
 
Unlike many other nations, France also has a relatively well-functioning private 
insurance system for long-term care that covered 3 million people in 2007 through both 
the individual and group markets, a number equivalent to 25 percent of the population 
age 60 and older. Private insurance benefits average €600 ($900) per month and are paid 
in cash, mimicking the public program. France provides no tax incentives for purchase of 
private insurance. 
 
Participation. The APA is available for those 60 and over. Eligibility, however, 
is quite restricted. No benefits are paid unless a patient has suffered a “loss of autonomy,” 
defined as needing help with at least three activities of daily living—a test somewhat 
stricter than what is stipulated by private long-term care insurance in the United States.49
 
In 2007, approximately 1 million people (1.6 percent of the population) were 
receiving public long-term care benefits under the APA. 
 
Benefits. Institutional care is provided through the national health system. 
Assistance at home is covered by the long-term care program and is based on four levels 
of need. France offers a monthly cash benefit, which individuals may use for a wide 
variety of long-term care purposes, from hiring caregivers to renovating homes. The cash 
benefit may be used to hire family members as caregivers (though not spouses). Benefits 
include case management services. 
 
Everyone who meets the minimum disability test is eligible for some benefits. 
The average monthly benefit in 2007 for those receiving home care was €413 ($621),50  
representing approximately one-third of costs.51 However, the level of assistance declines 
sharply with higher income. For instance, an individual with resources of $1,232 per 
month or less is eligible for benefits of up to $1,436 per month. A person at the same 
level of medical need, but with resources of $4,104, would receive only $286.52
 
While the program is managed by the administrative regions, or departments, 
benefits are equal throughout the country. To compensate for difference in resources 
across regions, the central government redistributes funds to the departments.53
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Lessons for the U.S. The APA was enacted amid great uncertainty about the 
number of families that would seek assistance. Two previous attempts at reform had 
failed, in part because so few elderly participated. However, both participation and 
program costs of the APA have been far higher than anticipated. For example, the 
expected first-year cost was $3.6 billion, but actual expenditures reached $4.9 billion. 
 
In response to these costs, the government began trimming benefits in 2003. 
Among the changes: a longer waiting period before benefits may be accessed, restrictions 
on how they may be spent, and a reduction in the income ceiling below which one can 
receive full benefits.54
 
Cash benefits appear to be quite popular in France, and are the basis for both 
public home care assistance and private insurance. 
 
United Kingdom 
In many ways, the U.K.’s long-term care system is the most similar to that of the United 
States. In a scheme resembling Medicaid, personal long-term care services are provided 
on a means-tested basis by local government. There is, however, an ongoing debate on 
how to restructure the system, a discussion that has taken on new urgency in recent 
months following two major initiatives by the government of Prime Minister  
Gordon Brown. 
 
Currently, skilled nursing care is provided at no cost by the National Health 
Service. However, personal care, which is excluded from the NHS, is provided on a 
means-tested basis by local authorities and financed separately through the long-term 
care system. Because of broad geographic disparities in benefits and eligibility, the 
system is often disparagingly referred to as the “postcode lottery.”55
 
Financing: Long-term care is funded with a mix of central government grants, 
local taxes, and beneficiary copayments.56 In 2000, the U.K. spent the equivalent of 
about $30.8 billion, or 1.37 percent of GDP, on long-term care. One-third is paid 
privately, while the government pays the rest.57
 
Participation. An estimated 4 percent of seniors in the U.K. receive government-
provided home care, while about 9 percent have purchased it on their own. 
Approximately 5 percent of those 65 and older receive institutional care. Those with 
assets that exceed £23,000 ($36,000) are not eligible for government support. Those who 
fall below that cap must share costs, with copayments rising with income. 
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Benefits. Local governments have coordinated the U.K. system since 1993. 
Except for nursing care, all personal assistance, sometimes known as social care, is 
subject to means-tested copayments that are set by local governments.58 Provider fees are 
set by contracts with local governments and vary widely throughout the country. 
 
Following the recent trend in Europe, local governments have been required since 
2003 to provide a cash alternative to traditional in-kind service benefits. Participation has 
been very low, however—only 0.5 percent of those over 64 after the first year.59 The 
U.K. also provides an additional Carer’s Allowance—an extra cash benefit for provision 
of intensive levels of care by members of low-income families.60
 
The level of government support for long-term care has been the subject of 
intense policy debate in the U.K. for a decade. In 1999, a royal commission proposed that 
both nursing and personal care be paid through general tax revenues, with no means test 
for beneficiaries. An asset test would be imposed only for room and board.61 While 
Scotland adopted these recommendations, England dropped its means test only for 
nursing care. 
 
In 2006, an important study by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation determined that 
“the public finds the present system incomprehensible and considers its outcomes 
unjust.” It recommended fundamental reform, but also suggested some incremental 
changes. These included providing more flexible benefits, increasing the personal 
allowance for those in nursing homes, requiring those who are admitted to nursing homes 
under the NHS to pay for room and board, and using program savings to increase benefits 
for all nursing home residents.62
 
Also in 2006, the King’s Fund recommended what it called a partnership model. 
Under this plan, authored by Derek Wanless, a former chairman of NatWest and an 
outside adviser to then-Prime Minister Tony Blair, those 65 and older would receive a 
minimum guaranteed level of care at no cost. This care would represent about 66 percent 
of need. Additional assistance would be funded by a 50–50 match between individuals 
and government. This proposal would have substantially increased both overall costs and 
government expenditures.63
 
In July 2009, the Brown government issued a green paper titled “Shaping the 
Future of Care Together”64 that builds on the Wanless plan. The 2009 report 
recommended replacing the current income-based benefit system (which resembles 
Medicaid in many respects) with one of shared responsibility. It also proposed more 
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preventive care, expanding the use of cash benefits, and making benefits more uniform 
across the country. However, the paper did not specify a design, but rather outlined a 
series of broad options for reform. Financing proposals included a government insurance 
scheme or the purchase of private coverage. 
 
In November 2009, while the “Future of Care” paper was still being considered, 
Prime Minister Brown proposed a bill to guarantee free personal care at home to the 
approximately 280,000 frail elderly and younger people with disabilities who require the 
highest level of care.65 The cost is expected to be about £670 million in 2011–2012. The 
proposal is generally supported by advocacy groups but has come under sharp criticism 
from both Conservative and Labour MPs. 
 
Lessons for the U.S. In contrast to the rest of Europe, there has been insufficient 
public support for broad long-term care reforms in the U.K., principally as a result of 
concerns about cost. In addition, in contrast to Germany and, especially, France, 
relatively few consumers are receiving cash benefits. 
 
RECENT INITIATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES 
While most developed countries have created public long-term care insurance programs 
in recent years, recent efforts to reform long-term care financing in the U.S. have focused 
largely on enhancing private insurance. They include expanded state and federal tax 
incentives and a federally funded marketing campaign to encourage consumers to 
purchase private coverage, the offer of insurance to federal employees, and an expansion 
of the Medicaid Long-Term Care Partnership Program. This program makes Medicaid 
benefits more readily available to consumers who purchase specially designed private 
long-term care insurance. 
 
While these initiatives may have encouraged some consumers to purchase private 
policies, none have materially changed the nature of this coverage. 
 
Tax Subsidies. Both the federal government and at least 34 states provide tax 
credits or deductions for the purchase of long-term care insurance.66 The amount of the 
federal tax subsidy is based upon age, but in 2009 a taxpayer between ages 60 and 70 
could deduct up to $3,180 in premiums for approved long-term care policies.67 However, 
the benefit of this deduction is limited, since it can be used only if total medical costs 
exceed 7.5 percent of adjusted gross income. In addition, benefits received through 
private policies are generally tax-free. 
 
 18
Premium subsidies for long-term care insurance may have only modest incentive 
effects. David Stevenson, Richard Frank, and Jocelyn Tau compared purchase rates in 
states that have tax subsidies with those that do not. They found that sales are about 10 
percent higher where buyers can get a tax break. Credits increase the participation rate by 
about 20 percent, while deductions make no significant difference.68 Cramer and Jensen 
have estimated that a 25 percent reduction in premium costs would increase demand by 
only about 11 percent.69 In 2006, fewer than 300,000 individual policies were sold. This 
implies an increase in sales of only about 30,000, even with an extremely generous 25 
percent credit.70
 
As of 2005, seven states were offering tax credits, but most design their incentives 
as deductions. This structure provides the largest subsidy to the highest-income buyers, 
many of whom could be expected to purchase insurance even without tax incentives.  
For many other potential consumers, the cost of a policy is still too high, even with the 
tax break.71
 
The Partnership Act. This program, introduced in four states in the late 1980s 
and expanded in 2005, offers long-term care insurance buyers a trade-off. Normally, a 
senior living alone becomes eligible for Medicaid long-term care benefits only after 
spending down assets to $2,000 (excluding a principal residence, a car, and certain other 
personal property). However, under the provisions of the Partnership for Long-Term 
Care, a buyer of a government-approved long-term care policy may become eligible for 
Medicaid while retaining financial assets equal to the total value of her insurance 
policy—substantially more than a Medicaid beneficiary who has not purchased a 
Partnership policy. For example, once she has exhausted her insurance benefits, a buyer 
of a $200,000 Partnership policy could retain $202,000 in assets and still qualify for 
Medicaid. She would still have to satisfy her state’s income and functional disability 
requirements, however. 
 
As of 2007, 23 states were participating in the enhanced program.72 However, 
early evidence suggests that Partnership policies are not likely to reduce state Medicaid 
expenditures by a significant amount. In the four states that initiated the program in the 
1980s,73 only 218,000 policies were purchased over nearly 20 years. The Government 
Accountability Office estimates that as many as 80 percent of those purchasers would 
have bought long-term care policies with or without the Partnership provisions. In 
addition, because the law permits Partnership buyers to preserve more assets, they 
become eligible for Medicaid sooner than they would if they had purchased traditional 
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long-term care policies. As a result, government spending for those policyholders  
may increase.74
 
Marketing Initiatives. The federal government has also embarked on a series of 
marketing initiatives in an effort to enhance take-up of private policies. 
 
In 2001, the federal Office of Personnel Management began making coverage 
available to federal employees and retirees. As with most group long-term care insurance 
(and in contrast to health insurance), enrollees pay full premiums. There is no employer 
subsidy, but benefits are more generous than those of many private policies. On May 1, 
2009, the OPM announced a rate increase of between 5 percent and 25 percent for current 
enrollees whose policies include inflation protection.75 As of May 1, 2009, approximately 
224,000 federal employees had purchased coverage, a take-up rate of less than 10 
percent,76 quite similar to the private market. 
 
In 2005, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services initiated the “Own 
Your Own Future” campaign, a major joint marketing effort with participating states to 
encourage consumers to purchase private long-term care insurance. The effort included 
mailings to those ages 45 to 70 and the development of state Web sites. As of April 2008, 
18 states were participating.77 To date, there is little evidence that the initiative has 
resulted in significantly more sales. According to industry data, sales of private policies 
have been flat or down in the years since the project began. 
 
In 2009, only about 7 million Americans owned private long-term care insurance 
policies.78 Industry surveys of nonbuyers suggest that consumers are reluctant to 
purchase for several reasons, including the perception that costs are too high in relation to 
value, the belief that government already covers those costs, and a lack of willingness to 
plan for long-term care needs that may occur many years in the future.79
 
Given the limited success of these relatively modest efforts to expand the private 
long-term care insurance market, policy analysts have proposed more far-reaching 
financing reforms. While Congress has focused on the CLASS Act, it is not the only 
model lawmakers could have chosen. 
 
Alternatives proposed in recent years have followed three basic designs: 
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• Allowing private carriers to sell simplified long-term care benefit packages 
through Medicare, similarly to the way Medicare Supplement (Medigap) health 
insurance is marketed today.80 
• Creating a universal tax-funded insurance program that could be managed as a 
new Medicare benefit or through a new independent, quasi-governmental entity.81 
• Requiring individuals to finance a large share of long-term care costs before 
receiving the benefits of government social insurance. There are many variations 
of this design but, in each, individuals would pay what amounts to a very large 
deductible of perhaps the first $100,000 of care or the first two years of care 
before receiving federal benefits.82 Many of these public/private partnership 
schemes assume that consumers would purchase private insurance to supplement 
government coverage (Exhibit 7). 
 
Exhibit 7. Reform Proposals in the United States 
 Mandatory 
Government 
Insurance 
Private 
Insurance 
Funding  
Source 
Private coverage 
sold through 
Medicare 
No Replaces 
Medicare LTC 
Yes, at 50 Premiums 
Expanded 
Medicare 
Yes, 
universal  
for 65+ 
Yes, 
Medicare  
Part E 
Supplement 
only 
Income tax 
surcharge 
CLASS Act Available at 18,
opt-out 
Yes Supplement Premiums/ 
payroll deduction 
Government 
insurance as 
secondary payer 
Yes Catastrophic 
only 
Yes Premiums 
 
THE CLASS ACT: HYBRID COVERAGE 
While these ideas all have some merit, Congress has been considering the Community 
Living Assistance Services and Supports (CLASS) Act,83 first introduced by the late 
Senator Edward M. Kennedy. In 2009, both the House and Senate passed versions of the 
CLASS Act as part of their respective health reform bills. While the measures differ in 
their details, each creates a voluntary government insurance benefit that anticipates the 
purchase of private supplemental coverage. Enrollment would be automatic starting at 
age 18, but consumers could choose to opt out of coverage. 
 
In the Senate bill, after a five-year vesting period, CLASS would provide a 
lifetime benefit for individuals unable to perform at least two activities of daily living 
(such as bathing or toileting) without assistance. Benefits would be paid in cash,84 would 
 21
increase to reflect future cost growth of long-term care, and could be used for a wide 
range of services. Premiums generally would not be tied to income, although students and 
the poor would pay deeply discounted premiums. Contributions could be made through 
payroll deductions, although employers would not be required to participate. 
 
Coverage would be available to everyone who works. Policies would not be 
underwritten for health status, but older buyers would pay higher premiums than the 
young. Those living either at home or in nursing facilities would be eligible for benefits. 
CLASS insurance would become the primary payer for low-income beneficiaries. 
However, low-income participants would continue to receive Medicaid assistance to 
supplement the CLASS benefit. 
 
The CLASS Act grants broad authority to the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) to design specific insurance plans. However, the Congressional Budget 
Office and other analysts assume an average benefit of about $75 per day, which would 
cover the costs of hiring a home health aide for about four hours per day. But because the 
benefit would cover significantly less than total long-term care costs, especially for those 
in nursing homes, the CLASS model anticipates that many consumers will purchase 
supplemental private insurance.85
 
While early versions of CLASS attempted to fix a monthly premium, more recent 
iterations leave that task to HHS as well. The premium cost is highly uncertain. 
 
Neither benefits nor premiums are income-related (except for the student and low-
income subsidy), so CLASS should “feel” more like insurance than a government 
program. This reframing may make CLASS policies more attractive to some buyers. 
However, CLASS also attempts to hold down administrative costs, a choice that may 
limit the government’s ability to market the new insurance. 
 
The CLASS Act would provide cash benefits, as does the French model or Social 
Security disability insurance in the U.S. Such a design affords the elderly, the disabled, 
and their families the flexibility to spend the funds for such purposes as supporting family 
caregivers, renovating a home to accommodate a wheelchair, or obtaining assistive 
devices without having to navigate complex government regulations or limitations in 
private insurance contracts. 
 
Cash benefits, however, raise at least three important issues. The first is that 
families of the aged and disabled are often poorly equipped for the challenges of 
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providing long-term care. Second, a guaranteed revenue stream might make it more likely 
that providers, such as nursing homes and home health agencies, will raise prices.86 
Today, those fees are negotiated by Medicaid, the dominant payer. In a social insurance 
model, Medicare could serve the same function (as it does for post-acute care today). 
However, it is not known how providers will react to an environment where millions  
of consumers who receive cash benefits must negotiate a complex marketplace on  
their own. 
 
The third concern is how a cash-based CLASS benefit will meld with private 
insurance, where most coverage is structured on a reimbursement or indemnity model. 
 
More than any of these issues, however, the success or failure of CLASS will 
depend on the public’s response to a voluntary insurance scheme. Other countries studied 
here chose mandatory, universal insurance as the framework for their long-term care 
financing programs. The greatest uncertainty with CLASS may be the behavioral 
response to its opt-out provision. Insurance industry actuaries,87 along with both the 
Congressional Budget Office88 and the Office of the Medicare Actuary,89 assumed a very 
low participation rate—no higher than 5 percent—and relatively high average monthly 
premiums for earlier versions of CLASS. In private discussions with the author, others 
believe the participation rate could approach 15 percent to 20 percent. It seems likely, 
however, that adverse selection would result in significantly higher premiums than would 
a mandatory program. 
 
LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
There are multiple lessons to be learned from the experiences of Europe and Japan, as 
well as recent experiments in the U.S. They include: 
 
Americans are reluctant to buy long-term care insurance. To date, there is 
little evidence that tax credits, government-funded marketing, or a redesigned 
relationship between Medicaid and private coverage have significantly increased demand 
for private long-term care insurance in the U.S. These incentives may encourage some 
modest additional participation, but without a major expansion in the risk pool to drive 
down premiums, it is unlikely that the product will ever be sufficiently attractive to many 
middle-class consumers. As designed, private insurance alone does not appear to be a 
policy solution to the problem of financing long-term care services. 
 
Not all government insurance is popular. The experience in Germany, France, 
Netherlands, and Japan suggests that many industrialized nations will embrace universal, 
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tax-funded long-term care insurance. However, the history of the U.K. suggests that 
significant political opposition remains, even in a country that has had universal acute-
care medical coverage for many years. 
 
Most reforming nations have chosen income-related premiums. Several 
considered, but ultimately rejected, the idea of a premium unrelated to income. Rather, 
they chose to fund their insurance with payroll taxes or other levies explicitly tied to 
income. In contrast, the CLASS Act adopts a premium that, for most buyers, is not 
income-related, and therefore resembles private insurance. 
 
Most also chose universal benefits. Those nations that have adopted reforms 
over the past two decades have overwhelmingly shifted from a strictly means-tested, 
welfare-type benefit toward universal coverage. The shift is particularly notable in 
Germany and Netherlands. Japan provides universal coverage for those 65 and older. 
Even France, which sharply reduces benefits for those with higher incomes, still provides 
some assistance for all those age 60 and older who are functionally eligible. 
 
Here, too, the CLASS Act is something of a hybrid. All would receive CLASS 
benefits without regard to income, as they would with traditional social insurance (or 
private insurance). However, those with limited earnings and few assets would continue 
to receive Medicaid long-term care assistance, although CLASS insurance would be the 
primary payer. 
 
Costs have been higher than anticipated. The experiences of Germany, France, 
and, especially, Japan and Netherlands suggest that, where there is universal insurance, 
long-term care costs have been higher than expected. This trend is evident whether the 
system offers a cash benefit, a service benefit, or a combination of the two. The most 
significant cost growth appears to be for those with relatively modest care needs. 
However, with some adjustments in both financing and benefits, those costs appear to be 
manageable, at least in the medium term. This phenomenon could prove to be extremely 
significant as the U.S. shifts to a CLASS system. However, effects on demand for paid 
care under the relatively modest CLASS benefit remain to be seen. 
 
Cash matters. The choice of a cash benefit versus a service benefit appears to be 
extremely important. For home care to function at an optimal level, families will need to 
be trained both in personal-care skills and in hiring and managing home care workers. In 
the U.S., only a handful of training programs are operational. In Germany and 
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Netherlands (as well as in countries such as Sweden), caregivers receive far more 
extensive support and training. 
 
Cash benefits appear to be extremely popular in France, somewhat less so in 
Germany, and are rarely used in the U.K. In the U.S., a Medicaid cash benefit has been 
well received, but is available for relatively few participants. Private long-term care 
insurers charge a substantial additional premium90 for a cash benefit, so few consumers 
have purchased such policies. 
 
Many countries now exempt institutional room-and-board costs from social 
insurance benefits. Germany excludes the “hotel” costs of institutional care. Japan now 
limits those benefits to people with low incomes, and the Dutch are considering scaling 
back such payments as well. While the CLASS Act does not make this distinction, its 
very modest benefit implicitly leaves the burden of paying for room-and-board costs to  
a beneficiary. 
 
Varying benefits by jurisdiction. Finally, in most industrialized countries, long-
term care benefits are managed—at least in part—at the regional or local level, rather 
than through the central government. Each of the countries studied relies on some level of 
local involvement. However, this design appears to produce variable results. For instance, 
in Germany, the U.K., and the U.S., residents in some jurisdictions receive much more 
extensive family support than in others. In Japan, premiums vary by region, but benefits 
do not. The CLASS Act would provide a uniform, national benefit. 
 
ISSUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Costs. It will be essential to investigate why France, Japan, Netherlands, and 
Germany all faced higher-than-expected long-term care costs following recent reforms. 
 
Opt-out coverage versus a mandate. Most industrialized nations have designed 
their long-term care reforms as an individual mandate. This structure avoids adverse 
selection, which drives up premiums. However, the CLASS Act allows consumers to opt 
out of coverage. Little is known about the behavioral response to such an option, 
especially by the young. However, if large numbers of potential buyers decline to 
participate, and the risk pool is skewed by high numbers of those most likely to go to 
claim, the program risks failure. 
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Cash benefit. Further research is needed in order to understand to what degree 
the wide variation in different countries’ levels of acceptance of cash benefits is a result 
of cultural norms, plan design, or a combination of the two. 
 
Genetic testing. Will a voluntary insurance market continue to be viable if 
reliable genetic tests become widely available for diseases such as Alzheimer’s? This 
question may be as relevant to a voluntary government program as to the private market. 
 
Effects on provider prices. Currently, Medicaid negotiates provider prices. In an 
insurance-based environment, how would those prices change? Would insurers establish 
networks of nursing homes and home health agencies, and negotiate prices on behalf of 
beneficiaries for those services? How would consumers respond to such networks? What 
effects would the resulting revenue stream have on both compensation and labor supply 
of health aides? 
 
CONCLUSION 
With nearly half of all long-term care financed by Medicaid and less than 10 percent paid 
by private insurance, the U.S. system for financing this care may be unsustainable over 
the long run. Growing deficit pressures may increasingly limit Medicaid benefits even as 
the financial constraints leave the aged unable to support their own care needs. Financing 
will be especially challenging once 77 million baby boomers reach their 80s. 
 
Long-term care appears to be a risk that is well suited to insurance. However, as 
currently designed, private long-term care insurance may be unable to serve more than a 
small fraction of the aging population. Similarly, it provides virtually no benefits for 
younger people with disabilities because few consumers purchase before age 50. So far, 
government efforts to enhance public acceptance of this product have met with limited 
success. As a result, public insurance options or public/private coverage may be an 
appropriate solution. 
 
The European and Japanese experiences may provide useful lessons for the  
U.S. However, those models have not yet proved to be replicable in the U.S., where 
cultural norms suggest voters may be more reluctant to accept tax increases to fund  
long-term care than citizens of other industrialized nations. The CLASS Act reframes 
coverage as premium-funded insurance, rather than tax-funded social insurance. 
However, the key question is whether such voluntary insurance can be sold with 
sufficiently low premiums and can generate enough consumer interest to avoid the 
problem of severe adverse selection. 
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